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ABSTRACT
A loosely coupled distributed system is composed by
nodes, usually heterogenous, connected by a network.
These systems have enormous aggregate computing
potential. However most of this potential is not real-
ized unless the underlying software is able to imple-
ment the concept of single system image (SSI) on the
physically distributed system. This way the resources
belonging to a node could be accessed transparently
from any other node.
This paper discusses the issues of a process migration
protocol as an essential component of a distributed
system and its extension to the grid computing par-
adigm. The security issues are specially considered.
Keywords: computer security, clustering, grid com-
puting, load sharing, process migration, distributed
systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades the development of low
cost powerful microprocessors and high speed com-
puter networks have promoted a change in the com-
puting paradigm. Yesterday big mainframes have
been replaced by clusters of small but powerful com-
puters connected by high speed data networks. The
end user, instead of working on a dumb terminal con-
nected by a serial line to the mainframe computer,
now has a powerful computer at his/her desk that is
connected by a network to a large number of other
computers. Potentially, all resources that physically
reside on any computer on the network are available
for use by the user. However, this potential cannot
be fully utilized unless the users are able to trans-
parently access these resources. By transparency, we
mean that the users should be able to access any re-
source without worrying about (and indeed, without
being aware of) its physical location. This is what a
distributed operating system does. The goal of such
a system is to create the illusion in the minds of the
Supported by a fellowship of the “Consejo Nacional de Inves-
tigaciones Cientı´ficas y Te´cnicas”, Argentina.
users of a single timesharing system, rather than a col-
lection of independent but connected machines. Such
a system would therefore place all the resources of all
the computers in the distributed system at the disposal
of its users without burdening them with the need to
be aware of the details of the distribution. Some of
the most outstanding systems are Amoeba [1], Sprite
[2], MOSIX [3], Condor [4], etc.. Most such systems
work by running a copy of the same operating system
on all the participating computers and these copies co-
operate to provide a single system image (SSI) of the
system to its users [5].
Even when these systems look very attractive its pop-
ularity has not really grown. This is because of the
fact that there is a large existing user and software
base for Unix. Several distributed systems therefore
try to emulate Unix so that existing applications can
be reused with little or no modifications and so that
the users get a familiar working environment. How-
ever, there is another problem that must be solved
by today’s distributed system software. This prob-
lem arises because the distributed systems of today
typically comprise of hardware and operating system
software from a variety of vendors. Achieving the sin-
gle system image in the face of this heterogeneity is a
major challenge.
Systems such as Amoeba, etc., do not address the
problem of operating system heterogeneity as they as-
sume that all participating machines on the network
run the same operating system. There also are solu-
tions available today that address this problem par-
tially. SunNFS [6] and AFS [7] are examples of dis-
tributed file systems that are commonly used now to
achieve a unified view of the file system on a net-
work of workstations. Various other resources such
as printers etc., are now routinely shared on Unix-like
systems.
An important resource that is typically not shared
transparently on Unix-like systems is the CPU. Sev-
eral studies have shown that there is a wide disparity
in the load of various machines in a distributed system
at any given time of the day. While there are some ma-
chines that are heavily loaded, others are completely
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idle. What is desirable is that these machines should
share the total processing load requirement of all the
users so that the load distribution is more uniform and
ultimately the users see an improvement in system
performance. While there are user level commands
available in Unix-like systems (e.g. rsh) that allow
users to execute their jobs on any machine of their
choice, such mechanisms are clearly not transparent.
In an ideal setting, a user would just fire a job and
the system would automatically select the best loca-
tion (i.e., , the least loaded machine) to execute the
job. A stricter form of such load sharing is called load
balancing, wherein the system strives to balance the
load on all machines at all times. While load sharing
would just require the system to select the best ma-
chine for executing a newly submitted job and trans-
parently transfer the job to that machine, load balanc-
ing would typically call for migrating a job to an-
other machine, possibly during its execution. These
two forms of process migration are usually known as
nonpreemptive (also known as remote execution) and
preemptive process migration respectively.
It can be easily seen that nonpreemptive process mi-
gration can be more easily implemented than preemp-
tive migration. This is because the latter requires the
system to checkpoint the state of a process already
in execution and then transfer this state to the tar-
get machine. Clearly this is a very hard problem if
the two machines are architecturally different, for in
that case the checkpointing would have to be done at
the source program level and not the executable code
level. Tui [8] is an example of a system that allows
executing processes to migrate to architecturally dif-
ferent machines. However, in this case, the process
of migration is not transparent to the application pro-
gram, and the application must cooperate with the mi-
gration software in order to migrate successfully. Fur-
ther, the migration process is also costlier in terms of
time since the entire state (which might be quite large)
has to be transferred to the destination machine. Stud-
ies have shown that this additional overhead severely
restricts the performance benefit that can be obtained
by using preemptive task transfer as compared to non-
preemptive process migration [9]. Nonpreemptive
migration does not incur this additional cost since
only newly submitted jobs are transferred to other ma-
chines, and therefore there is no address space image
to transfer. Further, heterogeneity is much more eas-
ily accommodated. There are two orthogonal issues
related to load sharing. The first one relates to the
policies for migration. For example, when should a
machine attempt to transfer a process to another ma-
chine, which process should be migrated and to which
machine? The second issue relates to the mechanisms
for transferring processes and with ensuring that a mi-
grated job will get roughly the same environment as
it would have on the machine where it actually origi-
nated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section describes the policies and migration
mechanisms of a load sharing system. Section 3
presents the security problems at the cluster level.
Section 4 analyzes the issues of extending a process
migration system to the grid paradigm. Finally, Sec-
tion 5 presents the conclusions and future work.
2. POLICIES AND MIGRATION
MECHANISMS
Scheduling of tasks in a load sharing distributed sys-
tem involves deciding not only when to execute a
process, but also where to execute it. Accordingly,
scheduling in a distributed system is accomplished
by two components: the allocator and the scheduler.
The allocator decides where a job will execute and
the scheduler decides when a job gets its share of the
CPU. Typically, each node in distributed system has
its own scheduler to schedule processes on the local
processor, usually in some timeshared way, whereas
the higher level decisions of assigning a process to a
node is carried out by the allocator. Although there
are slight variations [10], this scheme seems to be
most natural in distributed systems. The reason be-
hind this is twofold. First, each node usually has its
own operating system which is capable of scheduling
processes. The second reason is modularity, the de-
signers can concentrate more on the relatively compli-
cated load distribution issues without being burdened
by every single detail of scheduling.
The allocator and the scheduler implement the al-
location and scheduling policies respectively. The
allocation policy tries to distribute the overall load
of the system to its individual nodes by transferring
processes among nodes. Scheduling policy simply
checks the set of runnable processes available to a
node and chooses to run the most suitable process
to maximize the overall throughput. The process
scheduling policy of any traditional operating system
might work as a scheduling policy, even though in
some systems special technique can also be used, e.g.
coscheduling [10]. In reality, scheduling is mostly
done by the local operating system itself. Hence, we
should specially concentrate on allocation policy. The
allocation policy does not actually perform process
migration. Rather, it helps the mechanism for process
migration by providing information such as when a
node should attempt to migrate a process out, which
process is suitable for transfer, to which node a se-
lected process can be sent, etc. Policy modules of
different nodes also exchange load information to get
the current load information of different nodes in the
system to make intelligent decisions.
Unix process management semantics are not easily
amenable to extending over a distributed environ-
ment. This is because of the inherent assumption of
a single processor in the system design, and more im-
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portantly the tight coupling of the process subsystem
with the other subsystems in the typical Unix-like im-
plementations [11].
3. SECURITY IN PROCESS MIGRATION
SYSTEMS
This section describes the CLEX mechanism of au-
thentication [12]. Subsection 3.2 presents improve-
ments to this basic security scheme, general solutions
that can be possibly applied to others process migra-
tion systems.
3.1. CLEX security
3.1.1. Authentication
The authentication applied on a client request is sim-
ply implemented by using a mechanism of privileged
ports. The remote execution client sends a request
using an UDP socket bound to a privileged port. In
every current Unix-like operating system the ports
between 1 and 1023 constitute the privileged ports.
This way only the Super User (root) is able to use
these ports using the bind() call included in the
BSD sockets library. The server monitors the port
number included as part of the messages and discards
them if they are not routed to the right port. This
method avoids most of the accidents provoked by an
unexperienced user (without root permissions). Since
only root is able to use privileged ports1, non root
processes are given temporary permissions invoking
the setuid(0) system call while they are issuing
a bind to the privileged port. The remote execution
servers accept requests at the port 3002. Authenti-
cation of a client node is also accomplished by the
server. The header of a request package includes the
NID (Node Id) of the client node. The server looks
for this NID in its database to assure this node can be
part of the cluster and it is correctly configured (Sub-
section 3.1.3). If this is not the case then the request
is discarded. Besides it verifies that the NID matches
with the IP address for that particular node.
3.1.2. File system
The current system does not include cryptographic
mechanisms to store the information locally since it
assumes a safe execution environment.
Moreover, the CLEX protocol assumes the presence
of NFS [6]. The Network File System allows to pre-
serve an uniform view of the file system at the cluster
level. A very important fact of NFS is its high avail-
ability; it is present in virtually every Unix-like oper-
ating system, essential feature to make our protocol
1Even in the first Unix-like operating systems this problem was
common, so at the end of the ’70s the system call setuid() was
introduced in System V (version 7).
2The port 300 was picked simply because it is not associated to
any standard service.
(easily) portable to different architectures and operat-
ing systems. Besides, employing an already existing
distributed file system instead of designing a new one
shortens the implementation time.
3.1.3. Nodes database
The protocol assumes that the set of nodes part of the
load sharing system is formed statically and that every
node “knows” the rest of the members of the system.
Every node has a list containing all the nodes (IP ad-
dresses) of the cluster. This list is simply called the
access list.
Actually the protocol does not support dynamic con-
figuration of the cluster. This limitation eases the im-
plementation and at the same time adds some security
by hindering the incorporation of hostile nodes to the
cluster. Anyway it isn’t too hard to include an hostile
node as part of the cluster, since there are not secure
authentication mechanisms. The intruder just needs to
replace (to impersonate) a node from the access list,
e.g. provoking a DoS (Denial of Service) and taking
its IP address.
3.1.4. Messages
The CLEX protocol defines a set of messages through
which the nodes in a cluster communicate with each
other to achieve clusterwide process migration. The
messages have different names, contents and these are
used for specific purposes in the protocol. There are
three type of messages: request, reply, and asynchro-
nous.
A node sends a request message to another when it
wants the latter to do some operation for it. Receiv-
ing a request, a node carries out a well defined oper-
ation. The receiver then sends back a reply message
containing the result of the operation. Asynchronous
messages are sent to another node to notify an event
of interest to the latter. These messages are not replied
to. The operation carried out by a node after receiving
a request or notification could be idempotent, mean-
ing that effects of doing this operation once is equiv-
alent to doing it more that once. Idempotency has
major impact in the fault tolerance operations. The
general description of a message also includes the po-
tential receiver and sender of the message, instances
when a sender sends the message, the receiver action
after receiving the message, behavior of the receiver
and sender in case of failure.
Request and reply packet formats
The formats of the request and reply packets are
shown in Figure 1. The first five fields of the pack-
ages constitute the header.
The Node ID identifies the sending node. The server
at the receiving host validates the Node Id by look-
ing it up in the access list. The Age Number is used
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Total Node Age Sequence Msg. ... Msg.
Length Id Number Number Id Data
Header of the request messages.
Total Node Age Sequence Msg. Error ... Msg.
Length Id Number Number Id Code Data
Header of the reply messages.
Fig. 1. Header of the request and reply messages.
to preserve the uniqueness of the process ids in the
face of a fault. The Sequence Number is used for er-
ror checking, e.g. detection of duplicated messages.
The Msg Id identifies the particular request. In order
to assembly the reply the server copies the header of
the request package into the reply header. The client,
after receiving the reply, validates it by comparing the
Node Id, Age Number and Sequence Number in it with
those sent in the request packet. The result of the re-
quested operation is placed in the Error Code field of
the reply packet by the server.
In the reply packet, if the error code is
-PROCESS MIGRATED, then the next bytes
contain the Node Id of the new node of the remote
process involved in the operation. If, while serv-
ing some request involving a remote process, the
server does not find the process on its node, then
it checks whether it is the originating node of the
process. If this is the case, then it searches the
process’s entry in the process reference table and if
it finds the entry, then it reads the Node Id of the
current node of the process from it and returns the
-PROCESS MIGRATED error along with this Node
Id back to the client. The client, on receiving this
error, redirects the remote call to the new Node Id
of the process. This new Node Id field is not shown
in the message specific reply format, but implicitly
exists if the error code is -PROCESS MIGRATED.
3.2. Improving CLEX security
The first topic we have to understand when trying to
address the security problems in an SSI system is trust
relationships. An SSI blurs the traditional boundaries
between ”inside and ”outside. Inside ends up being
the relationship between all nodes in the CLEX kernels
list, and outside is everything else. If it is considered
to extend the system to include nodes geographically
dispersed, then the inside becomes a complex set of
trust relationships that must be established in an un-
safe environment.
3.2.1. Authentication
The authentication scheme presented above is far
from being secure, everyone having root credentials
is able to break the system. It can be considered se-
cure enough only under very well controlled environ-
ments.
Conventional technologies, for instance the technolo-
gies employed for e-commerce, are designed to guar-
antee security in both ends, client and server. Though,
in a typical cluster, this mechanism necessarily be-
comes complex, since a node is usually client and
server at the same time (peer). The authentication
process of our migration process protocol could be ex-
tended using a more powerful authentication scheme,
e.g. Kerberos [13, 14] or Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI/X509.3 certificates). Even though certainly both
alternatives would improve the system security, it
would introduce a single point of failures. Now the
system depends on the proper functioning of this new
component, the authentication server.
3.2.2. File system
Even though NFS is very simple regarding to struc-
ture, it assumes a very strong confidence model: the
client trusts the remote file server. This is a dangerous
assumption in real world, since the server (or anybody
with root access) can obtain the files locally, or by
sniffing in a LAN3. Another problem with NFS is user
id spoofing because most of the permission validation
actions are made by the kernel at the client side. So
it’s clear the necessity of a secure distributed file sys-
tem replacing NFS. For instance we can rely on SFS
(The Self-Certifying File System) [15] or CryptosFS
[16], both introduce cryptographic techniques to the
distributed file system. Other reasonable alternatives
are AFS (or OpenAFS) and Coda. This way, using the
authentication, encryption, and access control mecha-
nisms provided by the distributed file systems the in-
transit information is safe from interception, modifi-
cation, and message injection attacks.
On the other hand if simplicity and availability of NFS
is a good enough reason to preserve it we can config-
ure NFS over ssh (sacrificing speed). This has the
extra benefit of working with NAT, unlike IPSec.
3.2.3. Nodes database
Certainly the only way to obtain a scalable and dy-
namic system is through a service able to add new
nodes to the cluster in real time. To accomplish this
task we need to implement a dynamic database (ac-
cess list). This decision carries the need of improving
security, since we need to avoid hostile nodes to be
integrated to the cluster.
This new scheme can be implemented dividing the
database into two parts. A static part keeps a list of
IP addresses just like before, being these nodes con-
sidered implicitly trusted. On the other hand we have
a dynamic list in order to allow the addition of nodes
dynamically. This list can be implemented by a dae-
mon that employing well known cryptographic and
digital signature algorithms4 permit secure authen-
3For example using Ethereal, a GPL-licensed software available
for Unix-like and Microsoft Windows platforms.
4For example Diffie-Hellman or MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone)
[17, 18] for key exchange.
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tication of peer nodes, avoiding man in the middle
(MiM) attacks.
Depending on the security of the surrounding envi-
ronment the nodes will compose the static or the dy-
namic part of the list. In the extreme case of a secure
and controlled environment every node will integrate
the static database (identical to the original protocol),
while in a not secure one every node will be added
to the system exchanging keys during the INIC mes-
sage5. Obviously there are hybrid compositions in
cases not so extreme.
3.2.4. Communication confidentiality and integrity
The original protocol sends messages without any
kind of protection facing potential confidentiality and
integrity breaks, meaning it is possible to intercept,
modify, and inject messages.
Possibly the easiest way to solve these problems is by
adding security to the IP level. IPSec [19] supports
various mechanisms of authentication and encryption,
and using the ’Encapsulated Security Payload’ (ESP)
mode it can encrypt all the traffic in layer 3. In this
case we can implement a VPN to include every par-
ticipating node, ensuring the boundaries between ”in-
side and ”outside of the system.
4. EXTENDING THE CLUSTER
A cluster designed to follow the above characteristics
will provide an increased computer power (exploiting
idle processors) and will be able to balance the load
of the system, smoothing the activity peaks.
Other interesting possibilities of the process migra-
tion in a cluster are related to a better exploitation
of the storage space, fault tolerance, access locality
to the data, better system administration, and mobile
computing [20].
The system described in [21] provides nonpreemptive
process migration for heterogeneous clusters Unix-
like. This heterogeneity means not only different con-
figurations, it also includes different architectures and
operating systems. These capabilities provided by our
system can be extended to a grid computing environ-
ment.
Various authors [22, 23, 24] have tried to precise a
grid definition. In fact, the concept of grid computing
is still evolving and most attempts to define it pre-
cisely end up excluding implementations that many
would consider to be grids. In this sense we won’t
try to precise this concept, we will use this term to re-
fer to a geographically distributed system where every
component is a cluster instead of a node.
Figure 2 shows a possible example of use of this sys-
tem. Let’s suppose Cluster A presents an overloaded
5The first action made by a node after booting is to send an INIC
message to the rest of the nodes in the list. This operation is part of
the fault tolerance mechanism.
status index, while the rest of the clusters are idle. In
this case A will migrate jobs in order to balance the
global resources, absorbing load peaks in some region
of the system. Even when this example is very simple
it is clear that complexity growths considerably when
we scale our initial cluster to a grid environment.
Cluster A Cluster B
Cluster C Cluster D
Fig. 2. Jobs are migrated to less busy parts of the
system to balance resource loads.
At first sight this technologies can be seen as able to
take any application and run it a 1000 times faster
without the need for buying any more machines or
software. This is not the case since not every applica-
tion is suitable or enabled to be parallelized. More-
over, some kinds of applications can take a large
amount of work to modify them to achieve faster
throughput. The configuration of the system can
greatly affect the performance, reliability, and secu-
rity of an organizations computing infrastructure.
4.1. Requirements
In order to extend such a cluster with geographic dis-
tribution certain design characteristics are needed:
Administrative hierarchy. An administrative hier-
archy able to manage this new and complex en-
vironment is needed. It determines how admin-
istrative information flows through the nodes of
the system.
Communications. In the CLEX original protocol
UDP was the chosen protocol for communica-
tion among processes distributed within the clus-
ter. This model is not valid now, it will be
mandatory to include QoS parameters such as la-
tency, bandwidth, reliability, fault-tolerance, and
jitter control.
Information services. A grid is a dynamic environ-
ment where the location and types of services
available are constantly changing. A major goal
is to make all resources accessible to any process
in the system, without regard to the relative lo-
cation of the resource needed. It is necessary
to provide mechanisms to enable a rich environ-
ment in which information is readily obtained
by requesting services. The grid information
(registration and directory) services components
provide the mechanisms for registering and ob-
taining information about the grid structure, re-
sources, services, and status.
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Naming service. In a grid, like in any distributed
system, names are used to refer to a wide variety
of objects such as computers, services, or data
objects. The naming service provides a uniform
name space across the complete grid environ-
ment. Typical naming services are provided by
the international X.500 naming scheme or DNS.
Distributed file systems. Most distributed applica-
tions require access to files distributed among
many servers. A distributed file system is there-
fore a key component in a distributed system.
From an applications point of view it is impor-
tant that a distributed file system can provide a
uniform global namespace, support a range of
file I/O protocols, require little or no program
modification, and provide means that enable per-
formance optimizations to be implemented, such
as the usage of caches.
Security. Any distributed system involves all four as-
pects of security: confidentiality, integrity, au-
thentication, and accountability. Security within
a grid environment is a complex issue requiring
diverse resources autonomously administered to
interact in a manner that does not impact the
usability of the resources or introduces security
holes/lapses in individual systems or the envi-
ronments as a whole. Security infrastructure
constitutes the focus of this work.
Fault tolerance. To provide a reliable and robust en-
vironment it is important that a means of mon-
itoring resources and applications is provided.
To accomplish this task, tools that monitor re-
sources and application need to be deployed.
Resource management. The management of
processor time, memory, network, storage, and
other components in this new environment is
clearly very important. The overall aim is to effi-
ciently and effectively schedule the applications
that need to utilize the available resources in the
grid computing environment. From a users point
of view, resource management and scheduling
should be transparent; their interaction with it
being confined to a manipulating mechanism for
submitting their application. It is important in a
grid that a resource management and scheduling
service can interact with those that may be
installed locally.
Computational economy. As a grid is constructed
by coupling resources distributed across various
organizations and administrative domains that
may be owned by different organizations, it is es-
sential to support mechanisms and policies that
help in regulate resource supply and demand.
User and administrative GUI. The interfaces to the
services and resources available should be intu-
itive and easy to use6. In addition, they should
work on a range of different platforms and op-
erating systems. They also need to take advan-
tage of Web technologies to offer a view of por-
tal supercomputing. The Web-centric approach
to access supercomputing resources should en-
able users to access any resource from anywhere
over any platform at any time.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The cluster environment is usually considered to be
immerse in a safe environment. If this is not the case
it should be needed to implement a secure system over
the hostile environment. In order to accomplish this
goal it is important to introduce secure underlaying
protocols, like the ones presented in Subsection 3.2.
So a logical approach is to study different alternatives
able to isolate the impact on the performance and het-
erogeneity of the system, since the use of cryptogra-
phy methods imply additional processing. Another
problem is portability, perhaps not every protocol is
available in every employed platform.
After the verification and optimization process of the
load sharing protocol7 we shall analyze the modifica-
tions and extensions needed for a grid environment.
For instance, we’ll consider the scheduling and load
sharing, network latencies, security, and a new fault
tolerance model.
Clearly grid computing technologies are still walking
their first steps but according to the web growth, this
computing paradigm goes in evident ascent.
Finally, without question one of the most promising
lines of work in process migration is the use of mobile
agents on the web. In this sense, instead of the work-
station and the pool processors models, the computers
are connected as interfaces to the model “the network
is the computer”, in this case transparency losing rel-
evance. Performance now dependes on the network
latency and thus the transfer of the process state is not
so important, compared to the LAN case. If the exe-
cution environment is safe, users will gradually allow
the execution of remote process on their computers.
Another important topic to consider is heterogeneity,
automatically supported at the language level. In this
sense, mobile agents on the web solve impediments
analogous to those in process migration, allowing the
massive use of both technologies, since they share
similar mechanisms.
6In this sense our research group is working on developing
graphic tools jointly with the “Laboratorio de Visualizacio´n y Com-
putacio´n Gra´fica” at our University.
7Besides a formal verification of the protocol it will be impor-
tant to have at least two implementations on different operating sys-
tems in order to check correctness and heterogeneity.
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